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Abstract
This paper investigates how the disclosure of a security
vulnerability index based on outgoing spams and phishing
website hosting, which may serve as an indicator of a firm’s
inadequate security controls, affects companies’ security protection strategy. Our core objective is to study whether firms
improve their security when they become aware of their vulnerabilities and such information is publicized. To achieve
this goal, we conduct a randomized field experiment on 1,262
firms in six Pan-Asian countries and regions. For the treatment group of 631 firms, we alert them of their security vulnerability index and ranking over time, and their relative performance compared to their peers via emails and a public
advisory website. Compared with the control group without
being informed of their security vulnerability index, the treatment group improved their security over time, with a significant reduction of outgoing spam volume. A marginally significant improvement in reducing phishing hosting websites
is also observed among non-web hosting firms in the treatment group. The security improvement may be attributed to
firms’ proactive reaction to the security vulnerability information. Our study provides cybersecurity policy makers with
useful insights on how to motivate firms to adopt better security measures.

1. Introduction
Cyberattacks impose serious threats to individuals, firms,
and our society at large. Even with technological advances
in security software and hardware, we are still experiencing
an ever-increasing number of cyberattacks [1, 2] Although
firms are aware of cybersecurity issues, they are still reluctant to adopt adequate measures to prevent the spread of cyberattacks. Such a problem is partly due to negative externalities, information asymmetry, and misaligned incentives [3].
Negative externalities refer to the phenomenon that firms in
a network have a higher incentive to wait than to adopt a security technology immediately because the cost of the technology
adoption
is greater than its initial benefit until a miniURI:
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mum number of network players adopt it.1 Previous research
shows that such a wait-and-see approach is widely used by
senior managers and it may lead to the ubiquitous security
breaches in the US [4, 5]. In addition, due to the quality uncertainty of security technologies available in the market2 and
misaligned incentives of for-profit firms, firms may deprioritize security issues when related security problems are less
likely to directly harm themselves, even though the issues create negative externalities to other firms and the general public
at large [3, 7, 8]. In this paper, we investigate potential measures which can be effective in increasing firms’ awareness
of cyber security and internalizing the externalities to develop
more secure cyber environments. This study also echoes the
origin3 responsibility principle of the research framework of
the Bright ICT initiative [9, 10] by proposing a new security
vulnerability index to incentivize firms to behave as good citizens and take a proactive approach to prevent the widespread
use of undesirable content over the Internet [11].
Similar to the idea of Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s
credit ratings, our proposed security vulnerability index may
reflect an organization’s vulnerabilities to cybercrime and its
adequacy to prevent the spread of unsolicited online content.
The index is constructed by processing large-scale, real-time
cyber incident data from spam emission4 (sources: CBL5
and PSBL6 ) and phishing website hosting7 activities (sources:
1 An analogy to adoption of security technology is vaccinating children
against a contagious disease. A parent may choose not to vaccinate their
children and freeride on others in the same community who have already
done so [3].
2 Such uncertainty may lead to the problem of “market for lemons” or
information asymmetry [6].
3 Origin refers to firms whose servers may be compromised to send undesired content to the Internet and the company owners may or may not be
aware of such a problem and have control of it [9].
4 Note that the term “spam mail” in this paper includes advertisement,
phishing mail, and malware attached email.
5 Composite Block List: https://www.abuseat.org/
6 Passive Spam Block List: https://psbl.org/about/
7 Note that phishing, in this paper, exclusively refers to website-related
incidents, and we only focus on the firms who are actually hosting the phishing websites on their own server. All email-related attacks including phishing
emails are included in our spam data.
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APWG8 and OpenPhish9 ). We choose spam and phishing as
data sources because they are the most commonly seen undesirable content on the Internet. Firms’ computers with inadequate preventive security measures may be easily controlled
by their adversaries via bots to send spams or host phishing
websites. As a result, the outgoing spam volumes and phishing websites hosted may be indicative of the security vulnerabilities of a firm. We are interested to test whether informing
and publicizing individual firms of their security vulnerability index may motivate them to adopt better security measures
over time. To evaluate the effectiveness of such approach, we
conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment (RFE) in
Pan Asia, which is characterized by blooming e-commerce
markets and heterogeneous juridical systems. Furthermore,
our research addresses several limitations of a similar study
by [12]. First, to our knowledge, we are among the first to implement RFE in Pan Asia, which is not restricted by one single jurisdiction on cybercrime. Second, because e-commerce
is blooming in Pan Asia, it is different from the U.S., where
the sense of awareness of cybersecurity is stronger. Therefore, our RFE treatment effects are less likely to be influenced
by external factors (e.g., stricter laws and stronger sense of
awareness on cybersecurity). Third, instead of restricting our
study to spam collected from a single data source (i.e., CBL),
we diversify the data sources and also include data on phishing website hosting. The diversification of data may increase
the robustness of our proposed security vulnerability index.
Fourth, He et al. [12] has a relatively short treatment window
(from January to March 2014) and analyzed the pre- and posttreatment in a 6-month window. We send out treatment emails
three times (July, September, and November 2017) and use a
more concise window of one month to measure the gradual security performance changes of firms over time prior to and after individual treatments. In addition to the treatment emails,
we develop a public website, cybeRatings, for the treatment
firms and the general public to search for and read more details on individual firms’ security vulnerabilities. Fifth, to ensure the treatment compliance, we adopt email and web analytic tools to check whether the treated firms have received
our treatments properly and to tightly monitor firms’ reactions
to our treatments. Finally, we implement more robust statistical analyses. Apart from the difference-in-difference (DID)
model, we also analyze the heterogeneous treatment effect.
Our empirical results show that the treatments (i.e., emails
and visits to the advisory website) induced a significant reduction of outbound spam volume. Our dynamic analysis
shows that there is a significant decline in CBL spam volume
after the first two batches of our treatment emails. Interestingly, although we do not observe overall treatment effect on
the phishing website hosting, an extended analysis shows that
our treatments had marginally significant effects on phishing
website reduction for the firms that are neither Internet service providers nor web hosting providers. Finally, we analyze overall security performance by Borda counts which aggregate spam and phishing volumes from different sources.
8 Anti-Phishing
9 OpenPhish

Working Group: https://apwg.org/
Phishing Intelligence: https://openphish.com/

The results show that the treatments can increase countrylevel security vulnerability rank, which suggests improved
performance among peers in the same countries. In sum,
our research findings show that firms have different incentives when dealing with phishing website hosting compared
to spam emission.
This study contributes to the cybersecurity literature in
multiple ways. First, we develop a novel security vulnerability index based on outgoing spam volume and phishing website hosting. Second, we implement a large-scale information
system to alert treatment firms of their security vulnerabilities
by emails and to publish their vulnerability details on a public
advisory website. Third, our study comprehensively covers
all firms in the six targeted countries and regions in Pan Asia
with at least one Autonomous System Number (ASN) and one
valid contact email address. Through the large-scale field experiment, we show that firms improve their internal system
security over time when they learn the information about their
security vulnerabilities by emails and our advisory website in
the short term. We also show disparate firm behaviors on disclosure of spam and phishing vulnerabilities. Our research
can provide useful insights to cybersecurity policy-makers.
Instead of using penalties to make firms comply, they may use
publicized security information to incentivize firms to adopt
better preventive measures to mitigate the widespread use of
undesired content. Our study also responds to the call of the
Bright ICT Initiative by developing an incentive mechanism
to promote origin responsibilities.

2. Theoretical Background
Researchers from information systems, computer science,
and economics are actively seeking the most efficient solutions to contain widespread cybersecurity threats. To thwart
cybercrime, prevention and protection tools are equally important. Whilst existing research primarily focuses on protective solutions, for example, spam filtering [13, 14], intrusion
detection systems [15, 16, 17], and digital forensics [18, 19],
few discuss preventive measures, which include rules and reminders regarding best safety practices. In fact, prevention
comes before protection; only when prevention fails does protection take place [20]. With note of the inadequate preventive measures to curb the spread of undesired online content,
the Bright ICT Initiative has established the origin responsibility principle [9, 10]. How to motivate firms to adopt better preventive security measures seems to be an important research question to be addressed. In this section, we discuss
related literature at the boundary of security and economics
that investigates the relationship among incentives, externalities, and security investment.

2.1. Misaligned Incentives and Security Underinvestment
Anderson and Moore [3] showed that economic incentives
are as important as technical designs in information security
solutions. Senior management is willing to invest in protective security that can safeguard their internal corporate assets
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from cyberattacks. In contrast, their incentive to invest deteriorates when the underlying technologies are to protect assets
of external entities. Because they bear no financial benefits
from such an investment, misaligned incentives may lead to
underinvestment in information security [21]. As a result,
managers may simply adopt the minimal security measures
to protect their own assets, rather than a comprehensive security solution that can prevent widespread cyberattacks to the
general public.

2.2. Heterogeneity Defense
Sharman et al. [22] show that the diversity in security investment is important to deter cybercrime. Such a strategy
is known as “functionality defense by heterogeneity.” If a
firm only focuses on one type of security (e.g., protection)
with negligence on another (e.g., prevention), the security solutions are not considered to be thorough. A firm that fails to
invest in comprehensive security not only increases the probability of its own security risks but also increases the likelihood
that such risks will spill over to other firms [23]. Instead,
diversification in security investment may help prevent correlated failures (e.g., shared vulnerabilities due to homogeneous
security investment and loss of availability of connected company networks) [24].

2.3. Information Disclosure as Externality
Network externalities may provide some explanation regarding the reluctance of firms to adopt adequate security
measures. Kunreuther and Heal [25] demonstrate that the security of a group of people often leans on each of its members.
As one user in the system takes more precautions to protect
his/her computers, the less the others in the same group will
be infected or intruded upon. Such a setting leads to the classic free-rider problem that each user in the system lacks the
incentive to adequately protect themselves against attacks or
viruses because the cost of the spread of the attacks or viruses
is borne by other users. Therefore, in the absence of a market
for appropriate incentives, individuals will choose less security than the social optimal level. In other words, firms may
deprioritize IT security problems when they are less likely to
directly harm themselves, even though they create negative
externalities to others (e.g., spam and phishing attacks initiated by their compromised computers).
To combat the problems brought by the negative externalities of security underinvestment, one approach can be to alert
firms of their security vulnerabilities and the associated loss
due to such insecurity. To quantify such loss, previous research proposes the use of a “vulnerability matrix” [26] and
“node failure correlation matrix” [24]. Besides enhancing
awareness, public disclosure of attack incidents may help defenders get prepared against cybercrime [27]. In the same
token, public disclosure of a firm’s vulnerabilities in spam
may make the firm take more proactive security action to salvage its public reputation [28]. Such disclosure may also alleviate the information asymmetry issue and allow firms to
better understand their security weakness [12]. Furthermore,

social comparison and peer pressure may incentivize firms
even more to adopt better countermeasures [29]. It may also
serve as an additional externality to raise firms’ cybersecurity
awareness due to the fear of losing customers to their competitors [30].
Based on the literature review, we find that security awareness enhancement can be an effective mechanism to motivate
firms to adopt an optimal level of security solutions and prevent the wide spread of undesired online content. To achieve
this aim, we can inform firms of their security vulnerabilities.
To amplify the effect, we can use the method of public disclosure and facilitate firms to compare their security performance
with that of their peers. In the next section, we will discuss
how to evaluate the effectiveness of such a design through a
randomized field experiment.

3. Experimental Design and Implementation
3.1. Development of Security Vulnerability Index
An organization’s Internet security condition is a latent
variable that cannot be directly measured. However, one way
to estimate it is by the use of perceptible data. Security attacks
originating from a corporate network may be a good indicator of weak security infrastructure. To estimate the number of
attacks, we can use outbound spam volume and phishing websites as proxies. According to Symantec’s MessageLabs, over
50% of spam is sent by botnets [31]. These infected computers and servers may be used by adversaries as media for
even more serious cyberattacks, for example, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, identity thefts, hacking, data
breaches, and cyber vandalism. In this research, we use (1)
outbound spam volume generated from a corporate network
and (2) number of phishing websites hosted in the corporate
network to construct a comprehensive security vulnerability
index.
To construct a composite ranking from four constituent
rankings from each data source (i.e., CBL, PSBL, APWG,
and OpenPhish), we use Borda count [32]. First, we extract
the ranking for each of the five combinations of data sources
and metrics (CBL Volume, PSBL Volume, APWG volume,
OpenPhish volume, and HSIC) with worse performance being ranked higher in terms of spam or phishing volume. Next,
we can construct the composite Borda ranking by taking a
firm’s rank k for a given ranking and grant that firm a point
of (n + 1 - k) for that ranking, where n is the total number
of firms in that ranking. Finally, we sum these points for the
individual rankings to produce the Borda count for each firm.
Firms with higher Borda counts get higher composite Borda
ranks, which indicate worse performance. Firms with the best
security level (e.g., no spam and phishing volume) are ranked
equally the lowest.

3.2. Randomized Field Experiment (RFE)
To causally test whether publicized security information
increases firms’ awareness and eventually improves their security over time, we employ randomized field experiment
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Table 1: Number of firms for each country and district
Countries and
Districts
Hong Kong
Mainland China
Singapore
Malaysia
Taiwan
Macau
Others
Total

Figure 1: Design of the Randomized Field Experiment
(RFE) along with econometric analysis as the main evaluation methodology. RFE, also referred to as a randomized controlled trial, is a well-established evaluation methodology in
the social sciences for policy interventions, in which the findings can be explained by different factors associated with the
interventions [33]. The main advantage of this methodology
is its capability of detecting a causal relationship in a naturally
occurring environment.
The firms in this experiment were split into two equally
sized, statistically homogeneous groups by stratified and
match-pair randomization [34]. The grouping is summarized
in Figure 1. In the treatment group, advisory emails with security evaluation reports were sent to relevant contacts within
each organization in three different time periods. Each treatment email included (i) the organization’s spam and phishing
data, such as total spam mail and phishing website hosting
volume, (ii) peer rankings in the corresponding industry sectors or certain region, and (iii) a hyperlink to a designated advisory webpage for the treated firm. The webpage also facilitated peer search of security vulnerability reports over time.
In the control group, there was no such treatment.

Figure 2: System Architecture

3.3. Data
Firstly, we collected a full list of 1,930 registered ASN information from the target Pan-Asian countries and regions via
the WHOIS database10 . After mapping the ASNs to registered
10 WHOIS

database: https://whois.icann.org/en

Number of
Firms
309
309
264
171
138
4
67
1,262

Control
Group

Treatment
Group

631

631

1,262

company names, we created a list of 1,293 firms who own at
least one ASN. Lastly, we manually collected and validated
corporate email addresses from those firms and finalized a
list of 1,262 firms. It is important to point out that our field
experiment was conducted with a “full population” of firms
who own at least one registered ASN and a valid email address in six Pan-Asian countries and regions. Table 1 shows
the number of firms in each country. Figure 2 illustrates the
architecture of the entire experimental system. The system is
concurrently hosted by two authors’ research centers.

4. Empirical Analysis
Our data were taken from 1,262 firms from six Pan-Asian
countries and regions: Hong Kong, Mainland China, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Macau. Among them, 631 firms
were randomly selected for the treatment group and the rest
were placed in the control group. Once we received approval
from the human research ethics committees of the authors’
universities to implement this research, we contacted firms in
the treatment group to provide them with the opportunity to
opt out of the experiment and three firms choose to opt out.
Starting in July 2017, we sent out a batch of security information emails to firms in the treatment group every two months,
for a total of three batches. Overall, 565 out of 631 treatment
firms successfully received at least one treatment email. As a
result, we used these 565 firms and their corresponding 565
firms in the control group as our empirical analysis data set,
for a total of 1,130 firms. Table 2 contains summary statistics
for the main variables in our empirical analysis. We collected
each firm’s number of IP addresses from Team Cymru.11 Note
that the Team Cymru does not have IP address information for
a small number of firms in our dataset.
To evaluate whether the security performance of the firms
in the treatment group had improved after our intervention,
we compared treatment firms’ outbound spam and phishing
volume prior to and after our experimental intervention with
those from the control group. Since the first batch of emails
was sent in July 2017, we used 6-month average spam and
phishing volume between January 2017 and June 2017 as
firms’ pre-experiment security measures. To check the internal validity of our randomized field experiment, we used
t-tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test) to examine
11 Team

Cymru: https://www.team-cymru.com/
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable
Log(cv+1)
Log(pv+1)
Log(av+1)
Log(ov+1)
Number of
IP addresses
If has social
media account
If has opened
treatment emails
If has visited
treatment website

Variable description
Log transformed CBL volume
Log transformed PSBL volume
Log transformed APWG volume
Log transformed OpenPhish volume
Total number of IP addresses
owned by each firm
If the company has at least
one social media account
If a firm has opened a
treatment email on or before this month
If a firm has visited our advisory
website on or before this month

Table 3: Baseline comparison for internal validity
Variable

Mean Difference

t-statistics

ln(CV)
CV
ln(PV)
PV
ln(OV)
OV
ln(AV)
AV
ln(number of
IP addresses)
number of
IP addresses
If has social
media account
HSIC
(first 2 digits)

-0.05986
-38.25
-0.03817
0.03769
-0.02108
-0.0001904
-0.001803
-0.0000164

-0.2962
-0.3251
-0.5162
0.2849
-1.0929
-1.3810
-0.2708
-0.5911

K-S prob
(P value)
0.909
0.796
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.1673

0.7346

0.751

101837.1

0.3094

0.751

-0.1815

0.8560

1.000
1.000

whether firms in the treatment group were statistically equivalent to those in the control group. The results are shown
in Table 3. We observed that the differences of the average
characteristics and the distributions between the treatment and
control groups were marginal, and none of them were statistically significant. Therefore, our randomization satisfies the
assumption of exogeneity.

4.1. Difference-in-Differences (DID) Analysis
We face a non-compliance issue as some firms might not
receive or actually open our treatment emails. Thus we started
with an intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis. We used a company’s spam volume and phishing website count from July
2017 to December 2017 as its security performance (i.e., dependent variable) after our experimental intervention. If a
firm’s security condition improved, we would expect a reduction of spam emission and phishing hosting compared with
those of the control group after our treatment. For the panel
data set of firms’ spam and phishing information from January
2017 to December 2017, we applied a DID model to estimate
the average treatment effect of our intervention. In particu-

Mean
2.099
0.393
0.0340
0.0678

S.D.
3.667
1.339
0.275
0.388

Max
18.420
11.969
6.125
4.663

Min
0
0
0
0

352,038.3

3,936,268

141 million

0

0.7035

0.4569

1

0

0.2062

0.4048

1

0

0.07080

0.2566

1

0

lar, the email treatment dummy variable email treatit was
set equals to 1 if a firm i was in the treatment group and had
successfully received the treatment email in month t. Specifically, the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression function is
as follows:
yit = α0 + α1 email treatit + θi + σt + it
(1)
where yit is one of the four security performance measures
in our data set. From Table 2, we can see that the distributions of all main variables are highly skewed, thus we used
log transformed spam or phishing volume as our dependent
variables.12 Moreover, in our data set, 20.62% of treated
firms have opened our treatment emails. In other words, about
41.5% of the treated organizations who received the treatment
emails have opened them. In Equation 1, α1 is our main variable of interest. If α1 is negative and statistically significant,
then compared with firms in the control group, the security
performance of those in the treatment group has improved after our intervention. To control for an organization’s timeinvariant unobservable characteristics and temporal variation,
we also included organization-specific (θi ) and month (σt )
fixed effects in our regression.
The main results are reported in Table 4. The results
show that among different security performance measures,
the treatment had significantly effect on firms’ outbound spam
volume as measured by CBL. The estimated treatment effect
on PSBL spam volume is negative but not statistically significant. On the other hand, for phishing information, there is no
evidence showing that our intervention motivates firms to correct their phishing website hosting behavior. The results support our proposition that firms will have different responses to
spam and phishing information. While firms care about their
own internal security issues (i.e., their own computers being
compromised), it seems that they are reluctant to solve negative externality issues (i.e., hosting phishing websites) [3].
Since three different batches of emails were sent, we can
evaluate how the treatment effects evolve from the first batch
to the third one. If firms put emphasis on security, they would
respond to our emails consistently over time. On the other
12 Specifically, using CBL spam volume as an example, the dependent
variable used in the analysis is ln(CV ) = log(CV + 1).
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Table 4: DID analysis on monthly security measures

email treat

ln(CV)
ln(PV)
(1)
(2)
-0.135** -0.000842
(0.0682) (0.0338)

ln(AV)
(3)
0.00974
(0.0114)

ln(OV)
(4)
-0.00766
(0.0121)

Organization
yes
yes
yes
yes
fixed effects
Month
yes
yes
yes
yes
fixed effects
Constant
1.893*** 0.287*** 0.0417*** 0.0779***
(0.0341) (0.0166) (0.00522) (0.00698)
Number of
13,560
13,560
13,560
13,560
observations
Number of
1,130
1,130
1,130
1,130
organizations
R-squared
0.014
0.053
0.012
0.004
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
hand, they may put lower priority on our emails after a few
months. To empirically test this, we have included three interaction terms representing each round of emails separately.
The results are reported in Table 5, which show that the first
two emails have significantly reduced firms’ outbound CBL
spam volume, while the last one’s impact is quite marginal.
Considering the fact that the outcomes of firms’ security protect measures may not show up until a few months later, the
significant effect in the second round might be partially due
to the influence from the first email. This result can be an
evidence of our hypothesis that firms do not pay enough attentions to security problems, as they stop responding to our
treatments after a few months.

Figure 3: Monthly interaction coefficients for the DID
trend test on CV
One common assumption of the DID model is the parallel
trend assumption, which means that in the absence of treatment, the difference between the control and treatment groups
is constant over time [35, 36]. Violation of this assumption

Table 5: Treatment effects of three batches of emails
ln(CV)
ln(PV)
ln(AV)
ln(OV)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
email interaction1 -0.157** 0.0230
0.00287
-0.0105
(0.0788) (0.0485) (0.00810) (0.0126)
email interaction2 -0.179** -0.00936 0.0252 -0.000239
(0.0801) (0.0340) (0.0155) (0.0156)
email interaction3 -0.0676 0.0145
0.00182 -0.00525
(0.0833) (0.0441) (0.0175) (0.0154)
Organization
yes
yes
yes
yes
fixed effects
Month fixed
yes
yes
yes
yes
effects
Constant
1.893*** 0.287*** 0.0417*** 0.0779***
(0.0341) (0.0166) (0.00522) (0.00698)
Number of
13,560
13,560
13,560
13,560
observations
Number of
1,130
1,130
1,130
1,130
organizations
R-squared
0.014
0.053
0.012
0.004
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
can lead to biased estimates. Though our analysis is based
on a randomized field experiment, we still include the leads
and lags of the treatment effect [37]. Specifically, we add
interactions between the treatment dummy and the monthly
dummies, and use the interaction with June as the baseline.
Figure 3 illustrates the estimated coefficients of these interactions. It is clear that none of the pre-treatment interactions is
significant, which shows that the parallel trend assumption is
met.

4.2. Treatment Effects on Firms with Security Issues
One possible reason of the insignificant results of PSBL
and phishing volume models in Table 4 is that many firms did
not have security issues (i.e., zero spam volume or no phishing
website) during the period of our experiment. Because security condition is a relatively hard characteristic to observe, it is
possible that our existing security measures doe not evaluate
all firms’ cyber security conditions in a highly accurate manner. Although these firms’ security protection levels may have
changed, we may lack the ability to precisely measure the difference in our current experiment. Table 6 confirms this. It
shows that approximately 40% of all firms in our data showed
a positive spam volume based on CBL. However, only approximately 22% of them had a positive spam volume based
on PSBL. For the two phishing volume measures, only approximately 5% and 8% of firms had a positive volume based
on APWG and OpenPhish, respectively.
For the reasons discussed above, we repeat the main analysis using a subset of firms which have positive outbound spam
volume or phishing website counts, respectively. If our treatment emails are effective, we should observe that spam volume or phishing website count from those firms have a larger
reduction after the intervention. The results are reported in
Table 7. For the first two columns, we only use data from
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Table 6: Number of firms in control and treatment
groups with positive spam or phishing volume

CV
PV
AV
OV

Number of firms
Number of firms
Number of with positive volume with positive volume
firms
before experiment
before experiment
(treatment)
(control)
1,130
228
230
1,130
131
120
1,130
31
27
1,130
46
43

treated firms with either positive CBL or PSBL volumes and
their matched control ones. For columns 3 and 4, we only
use data from treated firms with phishing websites in either
APWG or OpenPhish and their matched control ones. Compared with the data in Table 4, we found that the magnitude
of the treatment effect for CBL spam volume is larger. More
importantly, the treatment effect for PSBL spam volume is
significantly negative at 10% level. This result further indicates that our email treatment will motivate firms to improve
their security protection, leading to less outbound spam volume. However, for the phishing performance, we still could
not find evidence of a reduction in phishing volume. A possible reason may be the small sample sizes in phishing website
hosting data.

4.3. Hosting and Non-hosting Firms’ Phishing Websites
There were multiple potential reasons for the overall insignificant treatment effects on phishing website hosting behavior. First, there were only a small number of firms with
phishing websites during our study time period. In total, we
had 124 firms (in either control or treatment group) which
had at least one phishing website in any month. In addition,
our phishing measure evaluated the number of phishing websites hosted by the focal firm, and the websites were targeting
external entities. In that sense, there may be an externality
issue where the associated risk did not directly harm the focal firm. For the hosting service providers, phishing website
owners could be considered to be legitimate customers. As a
result, web hosting firms might not have a strong incentive to
take down the websites in question owned by their legitimate
customers. To testify this proposition, we further divide firms
into two groups: Group 1 consisted of only Internet service
providers and web hosting firms, with the rest being regarded
as Group 2. The results support our conjecture that the intervention had a marginally significant effect in phishing website
reduction for the firms in Group 2 and that had no effect on
the firms in Group 1.

4.4. Overall security performance
So far, we have investigated how firms’ security protection
evolves after our treatments based on each individual security
measure. Another important question to explore is how the
treated organizations’ overall security conditions change af-

Table 7: Analysis on subset firms with positive security
measures before the experiment

email treat
Organization
fixed effects
Month
fixed effects
Constant

Sample of positive
spam volume
ln(CV)
ln(PV)
(1)
(2)
-0.430*** -0.128*
(0.138)
(0.0708)

Sample with
phishing websites
ln(AV)
ln(OV)
(3)
(4)
0.178*
-0.138
(0.107)
(0.120)

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

3.255***
(0.0700)
5,544

0.538*** 0.335*** 0.697***
(0.0340) (0.0471) (0.0697)
5,544
1,200
1,200

Observations
Number of
462
462
100
100
organizations
R-squared
0.033
0.091
0.109
0.038
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ter our interventions. In order to combine the four different
security measures from both spam and phishing perspectives,
we utilize the ranking data based on Borda count, which we
reported both in the treatment emails and on our website.
After we have created the Borda count for each firm-month
observation, we rank all firms based on the value, by each
country or by each industry. Then, we use the rank information as the dependent variable and repeat the DID analysis.
The results are reported in the Table 8. The results show that
after our experiment, the treated firms’ relative security ranking has significantly improved (lower ranking means better
security performance). For the industry level ranking, the results are not statistically significant. It seems that compared
with other firms in the same country, treated ones have taken
measures to improve their security level. In addition, based on
the results of monthly interactions in Figure 4, we can see that
the main effect happened after the first batch of emails. This
also echoes the results in the main analysis that our treatment
effects last in a short time period.

5. Research Discussion
In our experiment, we used outbound spam volume and
phishing websites as two distinct perceptible cyberattack data
sources to measure the pre- and post-experimental cybersecurity risk level of the firms. Security rankings were published on our cybeRatings website13 to not only enhance the
security awareness of the general public, but also to increase
economic motivations for firms. From a series of regression
analyses on two different types of cyberattacks, we found evidence that the security report publication has a statistically
significant effect in reducing spam volume in a short time period. The results showed that publicized security information
may compel firms to adopt better preventive measures against
spam emission.
13 cybeRatings:

https://cyberatings.is.cityu.edu.hk
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Table 8: Analysis on firms’ security rankings

email treat

Full sample
Sample w/ security incidents
Country Industry Country
Industry
rank
rank
rank
rank
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.563** 0.177 1.304**
0.447
(0.276) (0.231) (0.532)
(0.459)

Organization
yes
yes
yes
yes
fixed effects
Month
yes
yes
yes
yes
fixed effects
Constant 35.44*** 22.59*** 33.74***
22.68***
(0.181) (0.144) (0.313)
(0.255)
Observations 13,560 13,560
5,472
5,472
Number of
0.261
0.135
0.153
0.071
organizations
R-squared
1,130
1,130
456
456
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interestingly, we did not find a statistically significant effect on mitigating phishing website hosting behavior. There
are two possible explanations for this: First, web hosting firms
do not have economic incentives to eliminate phishing websites because they are legitimate customers of the hosting services. This can be considered to be a negative externality
issue. Second, due to a lack of phishing-related laws and
policies, the malicious entities and telecommunication firms
face less liability risks for the phishing attacks and resulting
damages. Following this line, some ISPs and hosting services
may indirectly pass the responsibilities onto their customers.
Third, web hosting firms adhere to the non-self-censorship
principle. Therefore, they do not content filter web materials uploaded by their customers, allowing phishing website
owners to abuse the firms’ web hosting services for malicious
activities.
Although we did not have statistically significant results in
phishing reduction, we observed anecdotal cases in which our
treatment induced positive changes: among 46 treated firms
who hosted phishing websites according to OpenPhish data,
six of them actually eliminated all phishing websites within
one or two months after their first response (opened an email
and/or visited the website) to our treatment. Based on the
other phishing data from APWG, among 31 firms who hosted
phishing websites, four fully addressed the issues. This result
may suggest that the provided information was appreciated
and induced a certain level of improvement in the subject’s
information security condition.
To summarize, our results from the empirical analysis suggest that information security monitoring websites, such as
cybeRatings, can be effective in reducing botnet activities
represented by outgoing spam volume. Meanwhile, we observed that firms have different incentives in terms of managing phishing attacks. This work may have policy implications
in that stronger regulations may be required to internalize the
negative externalities resulting from phishing websites hosted
by malicious entities.

Figure 4: Monthly interaction coefficients for the DID
trend test on country level ranking
Apart from legislation, our analysis also shows that public disclosure of information security performance may be
an alternative approach to encourage firms to invest in security improvement and adopt better security measures. The
primary reason for such an improvement is that by alerting
firms of their security vulnerabilities, they are under significant pressure with respect to losing their customers and being surpassed by their peers in the same industries; thus, they
are willing to substantially invest in security improvements to
prevent future attacks and are more proactive in information
security so as to create a better corporate social responsibility
image. With all these reasons, public disclosure of information security performance may have direct and indirect effects
to encourage firms to invest in information security over time.

6. Limitations and Future Research
One limitation of our current experiment is that the communication channel to subjects was only emails. The emails
may only be received by operating staff, rather than customers
or investors of the focal firms. As a result, the publicity effect may be limited. As a future direction, we plan to expand
our communication channels to social media platforms (e.g.,
Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin, Weibo, and WeChat). Apart
from IT staff members, the social media followers may also
be informed of the security evaluation reports with the treated
firms. One unique advantage of using a social media treatment compared to an email treatment is that social media
are closely followed by customers and strategic partners. As
such, information disclosure on social media may lead to
more pronounced reactions from the treatment firms.
Another limitation of our study is the focus of the firms in
six Pan-Asian countries and regions. A possible extension is
to expand the scope of the experiment to firms in other countries. Because our data sources include phishing and spam
data from more than 200 countries worldwide, we plan to generate and publicize security reports for other regions. With a
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larger sample size, we may be able to test the efficacy of different treatment contents (e.g., security vulnerability index,
the index with a list of IP addresses involved in cybercrime,
and index with possible countermeasures).
Finally, our security performance measures only include
outgoing spam and phishing website hosting. Performance
against other common cybercrime (e.g., DDoS) can also be
analyzed. In fact, there is a possible spillover effect in our
treatment group. Emails alerting firms of potential spam and
phishing problems may make them aware of other cybercrime
and improve overall security levels to deter other cybercrime
as well. These areas may be further studied in future research.

7. Conclusion
The US Department of States and European Commission
advocate the use of 3Ps, namely, prevention, protection, and
prosecution, to combat crime (e.g., human trafficking and domestic violence). Despite the wisdom contained in the idiom
“prevention is better than cure”, it is also the weakest link
in preventing the wide spread of cybercrime. Due to negative externalities and misaligned incentives, firms may simply
choose not to adopt any preventive solutions. To some extent,
it is very similar to air pollution in that people who connect
insecure computers to the network do not bear the full consequences of their actions and make a poor security investment
[3, 21]. In this paper, we show that publicizing a vulnerability
index may rectify such misaligned incentives. To some extent,
such an approach may achieve similar results to other measures such as legislation [38], subsidy on self-protection [39]
and penalties/taxes for non-compliance [9] to heighten public awareness to related cybercrime. Besides, our suggested
approach requires lower processing costs (e.g., time and effort to collect evidence for prosecution) and may incentivize
firms to uphold origin responsibility, which is one of the four
principles of the Bright ICT Initiatives.
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